97 lines
3.9 KiB
Rust
97 lines
3.9 KiB
Rust
//! Types for the *m.forwarded_room_key* event.
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use ruma_events_macros::EventContent;
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use ruma_identifiers::{EventEncryptionAlgorithm, RoomId};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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/// The payload for `ForwardedRoomKeyEvent`.
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///
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/// To create an instance of this type, first create a `ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContentInit`
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/// and convert it via `ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent::from` / `.into()`.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, EventContent)]
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#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "unstable-exhaustive-types"), non_exhaustive)]
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#[ruma_event(type = "m.forwarded_room_key", kind = ToDevice)]
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pub struct ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent {
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/// The encryption algorithm the key in this event is to be used with.
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pub algorithm: EventEncryptionAlgorithm,
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/// The room where the key is used.
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pub room_id: RoomId,
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/// The Curve25519 key of the device which initiated the session originally.
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pub sender_key: String,
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/// The ID of the session that the key is for.
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pub session_id: String,
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/// The key to be exchanged.
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pub session_key: String,
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/// The Ed25519 key of the device which initiated the session originally.
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///
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/// It is "claimed" because the receiving device has no way to tell that the original
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/// room_key actually came from a device which owns the private part of this key unless
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/// they have done device verification.
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pub sender_claimed_ed25519_key: String,
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/// Chain of Curve25519 keys.
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///
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/// It starts out empty, but each time the key is forwarded to another device, the
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/// previous sender in the chain is added to the end of the list. For example, if the
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/// key is forwarded from A to B to C, this field is empty between A and B, and contains
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/// A's Curve25519 key between B and C.
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pub forwarding_curve25519_key_chain: Vec<String>,
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}
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/// Initial set of fields of `ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent`.
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///
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/// This struct will not be updated even if additional fields are added to `ConditionalPushRule` in
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/// a new (non-breaking) release of the Matrix specification.
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#[derive(Debug)]
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#[allow(clippy::exhaustive_structs)]
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pub struct ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContentInit {
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/// The encryption algorithm the key in this event is to be used with.
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pub algorithm: EventEncryptionAlgorithm,
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/// The room where the key is used.
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pub room_id: RoomId,
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/// The Curve25519 key of the device which initiated the session originally.
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pub sender_key: String,
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/// The ID of the session that the key is for.
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pub session_id: String,
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/// The key to be exchanged.
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pub session_key: String,
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/// The Ed25519 key of the device which initiated the session originally.
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///
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/// It is "claimed" because the receiving device has no way to tell that the original
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/// room_key actually came from a device which owns the private part of this key unless
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/// they have done device verification.
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pub sender_claimed_ed25519_key: String,
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/// Chain of Curve25519 keys.
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///
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/// It starts out empty, but each time the key is forwarded to another device, the
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/// previous sender in the chain is added to the end of the list. For example, if the
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/// key is forwarded from A to B to C, this field is empty between A and B, and contains
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/// A's Curve25519 key between B and C.
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pub forwarding_curve25519_key_chain: Vec<String>,
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}
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impl From<ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContentInit> for ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent {
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fn from(init: ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContentInit) -> Self {
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Self {
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algorithm: init.algorithm,
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room_id: init.room_id,
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sender_key: init.sender_key,
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session_id: init.session_id,
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session_key: init.session_key,
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sender_claimed_ed25519_key: init.sender_claimed_ed25519_key,
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forwarding_curve25519_key_chain: init.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain,
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}
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}
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}
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